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Labor and Employment

by Jerry C. Newsome*
and K. Alex Khoury**
This Article surveys notable developments in labor and employment
law in the Eleventh Circuit from January 1 to December 31, 2004.
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rendered notable decisions regarding the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA")1 and the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 2
Several district courts also weighed in during this survey period with
significant rulings on the FMLA and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA").'
I.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

Most of the notable employment law decisions rendered by the
Eleventh Circuit this year concerned the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"). 4 In Walker v. Elmore County Board of Education5 the court
of appeals addressed the issue of retaliation for pre-eligibility leave
requests under the FMLA.6 Also, in Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation,7 the court of appeals limited the definition of an "integrated
employer" under the FMLA.8 Additionally, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama handed down an interesting

* Partner on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams LLP,
Atlanta, Georgia. University of Memphis (B.B.A., 1987; J.D., 1991). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
** Associate on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams
LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College & State University (B.S., 1994); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (2000).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
5. 379 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004).
6. Id. at 1250.
7. 383 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2004).
8. Id. at 1257.
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FMLA decision in Baldwin-Love v. Electronic DataSystems Corp.9 when
it strictly construed the medical certification requirements of the
FMLA.' 0
In Walker the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
narrow issue of whether a pre-eligibility request for FMLA leave is
protected under the FMLA's anti-retaliation provision when the leave
would begin while the employee was still ineligible for FMLA leave but
would continue after the employee became eligible."
Plaintiff in
Walker was a teacher in the Elmore County school system. In 1999
plaintiff accepted a one-year employment contract, which commenced on
August 9, 1999. In December of that year, plaintiff informed the
principal of her school that she was pregnant and due to deliver in
August of 2000. When plaintiff notified the principal that she was
pregnant, she also inquired into what she needed to do to obtain
maternity leave following the birth of her child. The principal told her
she needed to submit a written request for leave to the school board.
The principal recommended, however, that she hold off on requesting the
leave until she knew whether the school board was going to renew her
contract for the next school year. Plaintiff followed the principal's
recommendation. On May 15, 2000, the school board informed
12 plaintiff
that her employment contract was not going to be renewed.
Plaintiff brought suit against the board of education alleging both that
she had been improperly denied maternity leave and that her contract
was not renewed in retaliation for her FMLA leave request. The district
court held that the board of education's denial of plaintiff's maternity
leave was proper because plaintiff was not an eligible employee entitled
to leave under the FMLA. Plaintiff had not worked for the school board
for a twelve month period at the time she made her request for
maternity leave, nor had she worked for at least 1250 hours during the
twelve months prior to requesting her leave. 3 Nevertheless, with
respect to her retaliation claim, the district court held that "the FMLA
protected [plaintiff] from retaliation for her maternity leave request"
because "'almost all of her
leave would have taken place during her
" 14
FMLA-eligibility period.'

9. 307 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
10. Id. at 1235.
11. Walker, 379 F.3d at 1250.
12. Id. at 1250-51.
13. Id. at 1251.
14. Id. at 1252 (quoting Walker v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1255,
1261 (M.D. Ala. 2002)).
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The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding regarding
5
the denial of maternity leave due to plaintiff's ineligibility.' The court
held that "[there can be no doubt that the request-made by an
ineligible employee for leave that would begin when she would still have
been ineligible-is not protected by the FMLA."'8 Regarding plaintiff's
retaliation claim, the court acknowledged that the "FMLA makes it
unlawful for an employer to interfere with the attempt 'to exercise[] any
[FMLA] right .... ," 17 The court, however, held that under 29 U.S.C.
9
§ 2612,'8 "the right to leave is provided only to eligible employees."'
Consequently, the court reversed the district court and granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation
claim, holding that because plaintiff's "request ...did not constitute a
protected attempt to obtain an FMLA benefit," her retaliation claim was
without merit.2 ° Notably, the court left for "another day" the question
of whether a pre-eligibility request for post-eligibility FMLA leave that
falls entirely within the post-eligibility period would be protected under
the FMLA's retaliation provision. 2'
In Morrison the court of appeals examined what it means to be an
employer, an integrated employer, and a joint employer under the FMLA
for purposes of meeting the FMLA's threshold jurisdictional requirement.22 Plaintiff in Morrison was a pilot for Magic Carpet Aviation,
Inc. ("Magic Carpet"), which is wholly owned by Amway Corp. ("Amway"). Magic Carpet contracted with Orlando Magic Ltd., which is
owned by RDV Sports, Inc. ("RDV"), to fly the Orlando Magic basketball
23
team to games and other events around the country.
Morrison requested four weeks off from work to deal with clinical
depression. His supervisor, however, only approved two weeks of leave.
When Morrison later requested additional time off, he was terminated.
Morrison sued Magic Carpet, Amway, and RDV for retaliation under the
FMLA. The district court granted a motion for summary judgment in
favor of Magic Carpet and Amway because it held that Morrison was
ineligible for FMLA leave because Magic Carpet and Amway did not

15. Id. at 1253.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
19. Walker, 379 F.3d at 1253.
20. Id. at 1252-53.
21. Id. at 1253.
22. Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1255-57. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (limiting FMLA
applicability to employers with at least 50 employees within a 75 mile radius of the
worksite).
23. Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1254.
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employ at least fifty people within seventy-five miles of Morrison's
worksite. 24 The court also granted a motion for summary judgment in
favor of RDV, holding that RDV "was not Morrison's employer, integrated employer or joint employer" under the FMLA.25 Morrison appealed
the district court's ruling regarding RDV26 The court of appeals
examined de novo the issue of whether RDV was Morrison's employer,
integrated employer, or joint employer under the FMLA"
The court held that the test articulated in Welch v. Laney2" was
applicable to determine RDV's status as Morrison's employer. 29 The
Welch test provides that when a court is considering whether an entity
is an employer of a particular individual, the court must consider: "(1)
whether or not the employment took place on the premises of the alleged
employer; (2) how much control the alleged employer exerted on the
employees; and (3) whether or not the alleged employer had the power
to fire, hire, or modify the employment condition of the employees."30
With regard to the first element of the Welch test, the court held that
RDV was the owner of the worksite because RDV leased the airplane
Morrison piloted from Magic Carpet when he was transporting Orlando
Magic personnel. 31 The lease agreement between RDV and Magic
Carpet, however, gave RDV no rights "except to have its players sit back
and be flown around."3 2 Because the court concluded the lease "did not
give RDV any meaningful direct control over or in the worksite itself,"
the court held that the first prong of the Welch test did not comport to
a determination that RDV was Morrison's employer.3 3
The second prong of the Welch test, how much control the alleged
employer has over the employee, was also insufficient to support a
Morrison was
conclusion that RDV was Morrison's employer. 4
required to wear an RDV identification badge, Orlando Magic ties, and
an Orlando Magic parka, and he was required to attend an employee
orientation at RDV. Morrison was also listed in RDV's staff directory as
an employee.3 5 The contract between Orlando Magic, Ltd. and Magic

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1254-55.
57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995).
Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1255.
Id. (citing Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1255-56.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1256.
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Carpet, however, specifically provided that "'all crew members,' the
'assignment of crew members to particular flights,' and 'directions to
crew members to conduct flights,' would be under the 'exclusive control'
of Magic Carpet."36 In light of the clear contractual language giving
Magic Carpet exclusive control over Morrison during his employment,
the court determined RDV's control over Morrison was the indirect
control of a customer over a service provider's employees rather than the
direct control required to create an employer/employee relationship
between RDV and Morrison.37
The final prong of the Welch test, whether the alleged employer has
the power to fire, hire, or modify the employment conditions of the
employee, clearly did not support a holding that RDV was Morrison's
employer.3" Although RDV could exert significant influence over Magic
Carpet, it had no authority to hire, fire, or modify the conditions of
Morrison's employment.3 9
Having concluded that RDV was not Morrison's employer, the court
next considered whether RDV was an "integrated employer" of Morrison
for purposes of satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of the
FMLA.4 ° To be an integrated employer, a company must be one of
several companies that have "(i) Common management; (ii) Interrelation
between operations; (iii) Centralized control of labor relations; and (iv)
Although
[A] [d]egree of common ownership/financial control."41
Morrison failed to present any evidence sufficient to satisfy the first
three elements of the integrated employer test, the fourth element of the
test clearly supported a conclusion that RDV was integrated with Magic
Carpet because Amway and RDV shared a common owner, the DeVos
family." Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that "[als a matter of
law, we do not believe that common ownership of two corporations is
enough for a jury to conclude that they were integrated into one
operation for FMLA purposes. " 4 Accordingly, the court held that RDV
was not Morrison's integrated employer.44
Finally, the court considered whether RDV and Magic Carpet were
Morrison's joint employers under the FMLA pursuant to 29 C.F.R.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1256-57.
Id. at 1255.
Id.
Id. at 1257.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c)(2) (2004)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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§ 825.106(a).45 For FMLA jurisdictional purposes, multiple employers
can be an employee's joint employer:
(1) [wlhere there is an arrangement between employers to share an
employee's services or to interchange employees; (2) [w]here one
employer acts directly or indirectly in the interests of the other
employer in relation to the employee; or, (3) [wlhere the employers...
may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly,
because one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with the other employer.4"
With very little additional discussion, the court held that Magic Carpet
and RDV did not share Morrison's services and that RDV had no direct
control over either Morrison or Magic Carpet.47 Accordingly, the court
held that the joint employer test was inapplicable and affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.48
In Baldwin-Love the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama strictly enforced the medical certification requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 2613'9 and granted a motion for summary
judgment to an employer when an employee failed to meet the employer's deadline for turning in medical certification of her illness.5 °
Plaintiff in Baldwin-Love was a call center representative who was
diagnosed with Bell's Palsy in February 2002. Shortly after her
diagnosis, plaintiff informed her employer that she could no longer
answer customer calls because "facial pain prevented her from speaking
on the phone."5 Plaintiff also informed her supervisor that typing
made her left arm stiff. As a call center representative, plaintiff was
expected to spend at least ninety-five percent of her time engaged in
these two activities. Nevertheless, plaintiff's supervisor accommodated
plaintiff's condition by assigning her work that did not require her to
talk on the phone. Plaintiff requested numerous leaves of absence in the

45. Id. at 1257-58; 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a) (2004).
46. Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1257-58 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(a)).
47. Id. at 1258.
48. Id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (2000). Section 2613 provides that
[a]n employer may require that a request for leave under subparagraph (C) or (D)
of section 2612(a)(1) of this title be supported by a certification issued by the
health care provider of the eligible employee or of the son, daughter, spouse, or
parent of the employee, as appropriate. The employee shall provide, in a timely
manner, a copy of such certification to the employer.
Id.
50. Baldwin-Love, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1225, 1235.
51. Id. at 1225.
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spring of 2002.52 On March 27, 2002, plaintiff was placed on medical
leave of absence pending medical certification after plaintiff's doctor
requested the employer "limit the amount of incoming phone calls,
[plaintiff received]... because [plaintiff's] conditions tend[ed] to flair up
due to excessive movement of the facial muscles." 3
After being placed on medical leave, plaintiff received an FMLA packet
that explained her FMLA rights and responsibilities. Plaintiff was
notified that she was required to obtain medical certification from her
healthcare provider regarding her illness and absences. Plaintiff
returned to work around the middle of April but took another leave of
absence from April 22 through April 29. Plaintiff then worked intermittently until May 29, when she took a leave of absence from which she
never returned.54
Although plaintiff was repeatedly warned to provide a completed
Healthcare Provider Certification Form to her employer for her absences
from March and April, she had not done so by June 28, 2002." 5 On
July 3, 2002, plaintiff received a letter notifying her that she had to
provide documentation from her "healthcare provider that substantiate[d] [her] absences since March 27, 2002 ... by no later than 12 noon
on July 11, 2002.", 6 Plaintiff was informed that failure to do so would
result in her termination for "unexcused absences."57 Plaintiff did not
meet the noon deadline; however, her doctor did fax some of the
necessary paperwork to her employer six hours after the deadline had
Nevertheless, plaintiff was terminated for unexcused
passed.5 8
absences from work.59
Plaintiff brought suit in the Middle District of Alabama alleging she
was improperly denied a leave of absence under the FMLA and was
discharged in retaliation for asserting her FMLA rights under the
FMLA. More specifically, plaintiff argued that she should not have been
terminated due to her doctor's failure to comply with her employer's

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1225-26.
55. Id. at 1226-27.
56. Id. at 1227.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1228. Plaintiff argued that a medical certification she submitted on June 12,
2002, was intended to cover all of her absences from work, including her absences from
March 27 through April 22. Id. at 1230. However, even viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, the court held that the medical certification plaintiff submitted on
June 12 applied to her May absences, not her March and April absences for which she was
fired. Id. at 1232.
59. Id. at 1228.
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"arbitrary" deadline.6" Plaintiff further argued that under Department
of Labor regulation 825.305(d),6 1 "an employer is required to 'advise an
employee whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete, and
provide the62 employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any such
deficiency.'

,

The court rejected both of plaintiff's arguments." While acknowledging "[t]he FMLA is designed 'to balance the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families,'" the court noted that it does so "'in a manner
that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers.'"6' The court
observed that Congress made the employee's right to FMLA leave subject
to the certification requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 26135 as part of this
balancing of interests.6 6 The court held that while employees have a
right to a fifteen-day window to correct or complete insufficient health
certifications, the fifteen-day window does not extend "to second, third,
and fourth
opportunities given to an employee to submit a certifica,
67
tio n .

Further, the court noted that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305,68 which requires
an employer "to notify an employee when it finds a certification
incomplete and requires the employer to allow the employee a reasonable
time to cure any deficiency," is not applicable in cases such as this one
where the employee fails to submit any certification.6 9 The court
further held that under 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b),7 ° leave does not
constitute FMLA leave unless an employee produces medical certification. 1 Accordingly, the court granted defendant's motion 72for summary

judgment on the plaintiff's FMLA and retaliation claims.
II.

THE EQUAL PAY ACT

The most notable Equal Pay Act73 ("EPA") decision handed down

during this survey period came from the United States District Court for

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1224, 1232.
29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) (2004).
307 F. Supp 2d at 1234 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) (2003)).
Id. at 1233-35.
Id. at 1233 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3)).
29 U.S.C. § 2613 (2000).
Baldwin-Love, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 825.305.
Baldwin-Love, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2004).
Baldwin-Love, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35.
Id. at 1235.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
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the Middle District of Alabama, which considered the issue of whether
a plaintiff
seeking equitable relief is entitled to a jury trial under the
74
EPA.
In Alexander v. Chattahoochee Valley Community College,7 5 plaintiff,
the Director of Admissions at Chattahoochee Valley Community College,
filed a complaint under the EPA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,76 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 77 and numerous other federal and state laws
seeking declaratory judgment and equitable relief.78
Specifically,
Alexander sought to require defendants to raise her pay and provide her
"with all back pay, allowances, seniority, and retirement benefits to
which
she would have been entitled had [she] been properly compensat79
ed."
In her original complaint, Alexander made a demand for a jury trial
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).80 Subsequently, Alexander
filed a proposed amended complaint and sought to withdraw her jury
trial demand. Defendants opposed Alexander's motion to withdraw her
jury demand pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d).8 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d) provides that a demand for a
jury trial under Rule 38 cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the
parties.8 2 Rule 39(a)(2), however, provides that a court may order that
a trial not be by jury if the court finds that "a right of trial by jury of
some or all of those issues does not exist under the constitution or
statues of the United States." 3 Thus, if Alexander had a constitutional
or statutory right to a jury trial, she would not be able to withdraw her
If Alexander did not
jury trial demand over defendants' objection.'

74. Alexander v. Chattahoochee Valley Cmty. Coll., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala.
2004).
75. 303 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17 (2000).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
78. Alexander, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. Plaintiff filed claims against defendants
"under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C.[] § 206(d); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by 42 U.S.C.[] §§ 1981a and 2000e through 2000e-e17;
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended by 42 U.S.C.[] § 1981; the [E]qual
[Pirotection [Cilause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the United States
Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.[] § 1983; 1975 Alabama Code §§ 1622-13.2(4) and 16-22-11(3); and Alabama contract law."
Id.
79. Id.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
81. Alexander, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1290-91; FED. R. Cirv. P. 38(d).
82. FED. R. Crv. P. 38(d).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2).
84. Alexander, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
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have a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial, then the court
could grant her motion to withdraw her request for a jury."
Alexander argued that because the relief she sought was equitable, she
had no right to a jury trial, and the court could grant her motion despite
defendants' opposition.86 The court acknowledged that back pay is
generally considered equitable relief, and thus, does not create a right
to a jury trial.8 7 The court, however, observed that Congress made the
EPA enforceable under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 8 which
gives private plaintiffs a right to a jury trial against defendants other
Accordingly, the court held that
than the federal government.8 9
Alexander had a right to a jury trial under the EPA for back pay, and
thus, could not withdraw her jury demand without the consent of
defendants. 9°
III.

THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

In 2004 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bartholomew v. AGL
Resources, Inc.9 1 considered the issue of preemption under the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 9 2 At issue was whether the
LMRA's six-month statute of limitations applied to a claim arising under
state tort law when the elements of the tort claim were intertwined with
the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.93
In Bartholomew, plaintiffs, five former employees of AGL Resources,
Inc. ("AGL"), were laid off from their field service representative jobs
during AGL's statewide reduction in force on March 10, 2000. Three of
the plaintiffs, Bartholomew, Childers, and Higgins, were offered the
possibility to transfer to another job with AGL by "bumping" an
employee with less seniority but they refused.94 The remaining two
plaintiffs, Moss and Johnson, were junior field service representatives
who lacked the seniority to bump anyone from their job, and they were
simply laid off. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
between AGL and its union, Bartholomew, Childers, and Higgins
submitted written grievances to the union. The union made a formal

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
Id. at

Id.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (2000).
Alexander, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292.
361 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1337; 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1337.
These three plaintiffs were bumped from their positions by more senior personnel.
1336.
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request for a grievance hearing, but after the hearing on May 11, 2000,
Bartholomew's, Childers's, and Higgins's grievances were denied. The
union took no further action on behalf of the laid off workers.95
On September 18, 2001, plaintiffs filed suit in state court, asserting
breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious
interference with business relations, and defamation claims under
Georgia state law. Plaintiffs argued that they had been wrongfully
discharged in violation of their collective bargaining agreement and that
AGL was liable for various statements made by its management
employees.9 6
AGL argued that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the LMRA, and
as such, should be dismissed because they were brought outside of the
LMRA's six-month statute of limitations period. The lower court agreed
and held that all four of plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by
the LMRA and barred by the applicable six-month statute of limitations.
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of
AGL97Resources, and plaintiffs timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
Prior to evaluating whether the individual state law claims were
preempted by the LMRA, the court outlined the preemption principles
that guided its analysis. 98 Specifically, the court noted that while "'not
every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a
provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301,"
a state law claim is preempted "'if evaluation of the tort claim is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract.'" 99 In other words, "'when resolution of a state-law[sicl claim
is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement
made between the parties in a labor contract,' the state-law[sic] claim
has been preempted."0 0
With respect to plaintiffs' breach of contract claims, plaintiffs alleged
that their employer violated its contractual obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement by terminating them without proper
notice and by not allowing them "a meaningful opportunity to consider
Because plaintiffs' breach of contract
their option to transfer."0 1
claims arose directly from the collective bargaining agreement between

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1338 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985)).
Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 220).
Id. at 1339.
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AGL and the union, the court held that the breach of contract claims
were clearly preempted by the LMRA.' 02
Similarly, the court concluded that plaintiffs' intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim was preempted by the LMRA.'0 3 The court
held that to consider whether the conduct at issue was sufficiently
"extreme and outrageous," an essential element of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim in Georgia," ° the conduct would
have to be considered by referencing the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. °5 Therefore, an evaluation of the merits of the
claim "would be substantially dependant upon an analysis of the labor
agreement." °6
Having determined that the breach of contract and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims were preempted by the LMRA, the
court next analyzed whether those claims were barred by the LMRA's
six-month statute of limitations. 07 The court held that even though
plaintiffs had not brought suit against the union, the claims were
properly considered "hybrid § 301/fair representation claims" subject to
the six-month statute of limitations period in § 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act.'0 8 Accordingly, because plaintiffs brought their
claims over a year after their claims arose, the court held that the
breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
were time-barred and properly dismissed by the lower court.'
In contrast to the breach of contract and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims, the court held plaintiff's claims for tortious
interference with business relations and defamation were not preempted
by the LMRA." ° Specifically, the court noted that the conduct at issue
in these claims took place after plaintiffs' termination and outside of the
grievance process."' Further, the acts principally involved company
officials suggesting to other employers that2 plaintiffs were laid off for a
reason other than the reduction in force."

102.

103.
104.
(2000).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.

Id. at 1339-40.
See, e.g., Northside Hosp., Inc. v. Ruotanen, 246 Ga. App. 433, 541 S.E.2d 66
Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1339.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000).
Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1342.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1341.

